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Abstract—Traditional intrusion detection systems are not
adaptive enough to cope with the dynamic characteristics of
cloud-hosted virtual infrastructures. This makes them unable
to address new cloud-oriented security issues. In this paper we
introduce SAIDS, a self-adaptable intrusion detection system
tailored for cloud environments. SAIDS is designed to re-
configure its components based on environmental changes. A
prototype of SAIDS is described.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are one of
the most vital tools for the security monitoring of informa-
tion systems. IDSs have been widely used for identifying
malicious patterns in network traffic and hosts execution.
Recent trends in the virtualization area have made clouds
attractive for organizations that choose to outsource their
information systems. Cloud environments present unique
features like scalability, on-demand availability, multi ten-
ancy and shared resources. Tenants are given the flexibility
to create, destroy, migrate and modify virtual machines
(VMs) with little to no effort. However such features often
affect the ability of the security monitoring system to detect
attacks [1]. Indeed a monitoring system specific to a virtual
infrastructure hosted in the cloud may include components
that are located in the cloud but outside the virtual infras-
tructure [2], [3], [4], [5]. Moreover those components may
only monitor subsets of VMs [2] or parts of the network.
Consequently, changes in the number of VMs (e.g. addition
of new instances) or in their placement (e.g. live migration)
require the security monitoring system to be adapted. Due to
the high frequency of those changes the adaptation process
allows little to no input from the cloud administrator or
tenants administrators and has to be automated. To this
end we propose SAIDS, a self-adaptable intrusion detection
system for IaaS clouds. To maintain an effective level of
intrusion detection, SAIDS monitors changes in the virtual
infrastructure and reconfigures its components accordingly.
Our contributions include the analysis of dynamic events
and their impact on the security monitoring system, the
design of SAIDS, and finally a preliminary evaluation of
SAIDS showing its ability to adapt the security monitoring
system. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II presents related work. Section III outlines the
main objectives of SAIDS and describes the architecture.
Section IV provides implementation details while Section V
describes a test scenario along with a preliminary evaluation
of SAIDS. Section VI concludes the paper focusing on future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
With respect to the origin of the analyzed data, IDSs
can be classified into two main categories: Host-based IDSs
(HIDSs) monitor local activity on a host like application
logs, system calls and system services logs, and Network-
based IDSs (NIDSs) monitor network traffic. Intrusion detec-
tion in the cloud is the focus of numerous research projects.
In this section we discuss the different approaches based on
their service model (centralized or distributed) and the goal
pursued.
Mazzariello et al. [2] present the deployment of an ex-
isting lightweight NIDS on the Eucalyptus Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS) cloud. The strategy is to deploy one
NIDS next to every physical server, monitoring a portion of
the network traffic for a specific number of VMs. However
in this approach the number of NIDSs deployed cannot
be adapted based on incoming traffic load in order to
avoid impacting the quality of detection. Also, there is no
customization based on individual tenant needs.
In Roschke et al. [3], the IDS is deployed in the three-
layer cloud service model. The proposed IDS consists of
several sensors and a central management unit for the whole
system. The sensors can either be HIDSs or NIDSs. An
HIDS is included in each VM initialized by the tenant,
whereas the NIDS sensors are placed on each layer by the
cloud administrator. A tenant can interact with and configure
the IDS through an IDS remote controller. However this
approach introduces a strong dependency between a tenant
and the infrastructure provided by the cloud administrator.
The cloud administrator has to implement and deploy the
key components of the monitoring architecture such as
the VM-integrated HIDS, the communication between the
sensors and the central management unit. Furthermore, the
integration of HIDS in each of the tenants VMs by the cloud
administrator raises serious privacy concerns.
Lo et al. [4] focus on reducing the impact of denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks by presenting a distributed cooperative
NIDS framework for cloud environments. The proposed
solution consists of several NIDSs placed on different cloud
regions, that exchange alerts with each other. NIDSs are
plugged in different sections of the cloud infrastructure,
along with services that are responsible for implementing the
inter-NIDS communication. Each NIDS can decide whether
to accept or reject an incoming alert by implementing a
majority vote. However the system can not be reconfigured
based on individual tenant needs.
Doelitzscher et al. [5] propose a solution based on au-
tonomous agents, that are placed inside running VMs or
at other key points of the infrastructure (firewalls, virtual
switches or data storage) to collect and analyze information.
The tenant can access all gathered events through a dedi-
cated security dashboard that provides detailed information
about the status of the services deployed in the cloud. The
configuration and deployment of the autonomous agents is
performed at the beginning of the VM lifecycle with no
further alteration ability in case a new service is added or
tenants request protection against a specific class of attacks.
The described projects present different global solutions
for cloud-specific IDSs that include many local instances of
IDSs (lIDSs). For avoiding confusion between the individual
instances and the global system from now on we will refer
to a local instance as lIDS.
Our main goal is to provide a generic monitoring archi-
tecture that can be adapted depending on the frequent envi-
ronment changes of a cloud-hosted virtual infrastructure. We
aim to automate the adaptation process, in order to require
minimal tenant input but also provide flexible monitoring
options depending on the tenant’s deployed services.
III. OVERVIEW OF SAIDS
We aim at designing a security monitoring system that
self-adapts its components based on changes in the virtual
infrastructure. We identify these changes and categorize
them based on their source. In section III-A we outline the
main objectives of SAIDS, while in section III-B we describe
both the cloud and attack models that we consider. Finally
section III-C presents a categorization of adaptation-related
events and a detailed description of SAIDS architecture.
A. SAIDS Objectives
The self-adaptability goal of SAIDS can be refined with
the following properties:
• Self adaptation: system components should react to dy-
namic changes that occur in a cloud environment. These
changes include modifications both on the hardware
infrastructure (server addition) as well as the virtual
one (VM creation, deletion, migration). Phenomena that
present high occurrence such as service addition and
load fluctuation are also a source of adaptation. To
achieve this, SAIDS features probes to detect changes
and reconfigure its components accordingly.
• Scalability: the number of deployed monitoring compo-
nents should adjust to varying conditions: load of the
network traffic monitored, number of physical servers
in the datacenter, number of VMs in each virtual
infrastructure. Scalability is achieved by instantiating
new lIDSs when their capacity is exceeded.
• Customization: based on the type of hosted services the
tenant should be able to customize the IDS in order to
monitor specific vulnerabilities. SAIDS allows tenants
to write and include customized IDS rules that target
their deployed services.
• Cost minimization: the overall cost in terms of re-
sources should be kept at a low level both for the
provider and tenants while enforcing the targeted de-
tection quality. We address this by enabling component
sharing between tenants.
B. Models
We briefly describe the system model of the cloud infras-
tructure and the attack model considered for SAIDS.
1) System model: We consider an IaaS cloud with a
cloud controller that has a global view of the system as
demonstrated in Figure 1. Customers pay for resources that
are part of a multi-tenant environment based on a Service
Level Agreement (SLA). Each customer is in control of an
interconnected group of VMs that hosts various services.
Two types of networks are constructed: one internal between
VMs that belong to the same tenant and one external that is
accessible also from outside the infrastructure.
Figure 1. Multi-tenant cloud infrastructure
2) Attack model: We consider software attacks, that orig-
inate both from within the cloud infrastructure and from
outside sources. We classify attacks in two categories, based
on their target. Attacks towards individual services, known
as service-level threats (e.g. SQL injection) and attacks
towards the infrastructure (virtual or physical), known as
system and network level threats (e.g. memory corruption
attempts, buffer overflows, spoofing attempts).
C. Architecture
SAIDS is a self-adaptable monitoring system that reacts
to dynamic events that occur in a cloud environment. We
classify these events into three major categories: virtual
infrastructure topology related, performance related and fi-
nally events that impact the size of the datacenter. The
classification of these events is shown in part A of Table I.
SAIDS consists of three components depicted in Figure 2:
local Intrusion Detection Sensors (lIDSs), the Infrastructure
Table I
EVENTS THAT TRIGGER ADAPTATION
Part A Part B
Change category Event Origin Adaptation action
Virtual VM creation Tenant, Provider {rule update, new lIDS}
infrastructure VM destruction Tenant, Provider {rule update}
topology VM migration Tenant, Provider {rule update, new lIDS}
Performance % Packet drop Traffic load {new lIDS}
Latency {new lIDS}
Data center size Server addition Provider {rule update, new lIDS}
Monitoring Probe (IMP) and the Adaptation Manager (AM).
The flow of the process is as follows: first, the IMP no-
tifies the AM about the events and relates the necessary
information. Second, the AM decides on adaptation strategy
and third it adapts the lIDSs. The components are run by
the cloud provider inside the cloud engine. The AM takes
as parameters the topologies of both the virtual and the
physical infrastructure and the customization requirements
of the tenants as specified in the SLA.
Local Intrusion Detection Sensors collect and analyze
network packets that are flowing through subsets of virtual
switches. A signature-based detection technique is used
because of its high positive rate in detecting known attacks.
Furthermore, it requires zero training time making it a
suitable choice for immediate efficiency. The packets are
decoded and preprocessed in order to check their payload
for suspicious patterns by comparing it with a preloaded
set of rules. If a match is found the packet is logged and
an alert is generated. The rules can match either service
or system level threats. Since signatures only match known
attacks, the rule database needs to be regularly updated to
take new attacks into account. A dedicated update manager
is responsible for checking if the existing rule set is up-to-
date and downloading the latest available rules.
The Infrastructure Monitoring Probe notifies the AM
when a topology change occurs (see part A of Table I). The
IMP sends to the AM the ID of the VM that participates
in the topology change, the hostname of the compute node
that the VM is deployed on (or will be moved to in case of
migration) and the IP address of the VM. The IMP is part
of the cloud engine.
The Adaptation Manager adapts the lIDSs on the occur-
rence of the events described in Table I. On a topology
change (e.g. a VM is migrated) the IMP notifies the AM.
The AM then relates the information to the list of services
running in that VM (VM info in Figure 2) and selects the
set of additional rules to activate in the lIDS responsible
for the virtual switch at the VM’s new location. This set of
additional rules can include specific rules configured by the
tenant (SLA info in Figure 2). The AM is also responsible
for handling performance degradation of the lIDSs. For
example, if the percentage of packets dropped exceeds a
threshold (given in the SLA), then a new sensor is deployed
and the monitoring of the network traffic is rebalanced.
Figure 2. The SAIDS architecture
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAIDS
A prototype of SAIDS was implemented using the
Grid5000 experimental platform [6]. We deployed a private
cloud using one of the Grid5000 clusters as hardware infras-
tructure. We used OpenStack [7] as the cloud management
system and Open vSwitch [8] as a multilayer virtual switch.
The OpenStack cloud computing controller is known as
Nova. Network and IP management is done by Neutron.
A. Networking setup
Neutron API allows to create per tenant private networks
inside the cloud. To segregate VMs belonging to different
tenant networks we used GRE tunnels. A span port was
created for mirroring traffic in the virtual switches to the
lIDSs. Both features were provided by Open vSwitch.
B. Component Implementation
In this subsection we describe the implementation details
for each separate component of SAIDS.
• For lIDSs we deployed Snort [9], an open source NIDS,
in VMs on top of a KVM hypervisor. Each Snort sensor
is responsible for inspecting all the incoming traffic
to a subset of virtual switches. Snort is a signature-
based NIDS that features a default set of rules for
frequently used services. The activation of additional
rules when necessary is done by a dedicated python
script (adaptation driver) that is executed remotely
through ssh from the AM. This driver also restarts Snort
so that the new rule set is applied. Oinkmaster [10], a
perl script that downloads the latest Snort rules from
various locations, was used for regularly updating the
rule database. It is instantiated inside each Snort server.
• The IMP is composed of notifiers hooked inside API
functions of Nova and Neutron: allocate for instance
(VM creation), deallocate for instance (VM destruc-
tion), live migrate (VM migration), and create port (to
get network information). The connection with the AM
was implemented through a ssh tunnel. All the hooks
were implemented in python.
• The AM was deployed as a VM in a dedicated server.
All relative information regarding tenants’ VMs (list of
services, compute node hosting the VM, IP of the VM
and IP of the Snort server monitoring its virtual switch)
is stored in a separate file. The file is updated on each
adaptation event (see Table I). Additional sets of rules
are also stored per service in the file.
V. EVALUATION SCENARIO
We are evaluating experimentally the effectiveness of our
approach. We first present a setup manifesting a need for
adaptation, followed by an attack scenario and early results.
A. Setup
To do our experiments we deploy a data center with
3 physical servers: one cloud controller and two compute
nodes. In the first scenario one tenant has deployed a virtual
infrastructure with three services: DNS, web and mail. We
place the web server and the email server in compute node 1
(but in separate VMs) and the DNS server in compute
node 2. We also deploy two Snort [9] lIDSs VMs (1 and
2), that is one per virtual switch to monitor on the compute
nodes. This scenario is representative of a production setup
that balances the load of monitored traffic across several
lIDS instances [2]. Thus in lIDS 1 only the rules that are
related with the monitored services (web and email server)
are enabled, whereas in lIDS 2 only the rules that are related
with DNS traffic. We use a python script that launches
random requests to the services as traffic generator.
B. Attacking scenario
An attacker located outside the cloud tries to mask a php
shell injection attempt in various legitimate HTTP requests.
The attacker uploads a malicious file through the picture
upload service of the web server. Since customized rules
against such attempts are activated in the corresponding lIDS
VM, an alert is generated. We then decide to migrate the web
server to compute node 2. Consequently, in a setup without
self-adaptation, the detection process fails because lIDS 2
has no web-server specific rule activated. SAIDS prevents
this failure as follows: once the cloud engine starts migrating
the VM, the IMP notifies the AM. The AM decides which
extra rules need to be enforced in lIDS 2, and modifies the
Snort configuration file of lIDS 2 through remote execution
of the adaptation driver. Finally Snort is restarted.
We have tested our approach with a 469MB Centos image
(1vCPU 2GB of virtual memory) over an 1Gb/s network
connection. The VM was migrated between compute nodes
having 2 12-core 1.7 Ghz AMD Opteron 246 CPUs each.
At the time of the migration there were no outside HTTP
requests to the VM and there where no changes being written
in memory. The average migration time without the adapta-
tion process was 2.1 sec. With the adaptation the average
time was 5.2 sec. We have observed that the adaptation
process time is dominated by restarting Snort (average restart
time was 2.4 seconds). Indeed each time Snort is restarted
the whole ruleset has to be reloaded. Whereas in the current
implementation of SAIDS the adaptation process preempts
the migration, in the future they will be executed in parallel,
which should reduce the overhead.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified three major categories of
events that require adaptation: topology changes, changes in
the size of the datacenter and performance degradation of the
intrusion detection sensors. We have described SAIDS, a self
adaptable security monitoring framework that takes those
events into account. Finally, we have presented preliminary
results that show the effectiveness of SAIDS.
In future work we will study more complex security
monitoring setups. Furthermore we will combine the security
monitoring of both the provider infrastructure and the virtual
infrastructures. We will also investigate how to give to
tenants partial control over the monitoring framework.
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